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* Add hardening monkey-patch to prevent IP spoofing on misconfigured installations * Remove rack-attack safelistpull/1337/head
3 changed files with 73 additions and 4 deletions
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# frozen_string_literal: true |
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# Mastodon is not made to be directly accessed without a reverse proxy. |
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# This monkey-patch prevents remote IP address spoofing when being accessed |
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# directly. |
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# |
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# See PR: https://github.com/rails/rails/pull/51610 |
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# In addition to the PR above, it also raises an error if a request with |
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# `X-Forwarded-For` or `Client-Ip` comes directly from a client without |
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# going through a trusted proxy. |
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# rubocop:disable all -- This is a mostly vendored file |
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module ActionDispatch |
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class RemoteIp |
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module GetIpExtensions |
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def calculate_ip |
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# Set by the Rack web server, this is a single value. |
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remote_addr = ips_from(@req.remote_addr).last |
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# Could be a CSV list and/or repeated headers that were concatenated. |
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client_ips = ips_from(@req.client_ip).reverse! |
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forwarded_ips = ips_from(@req.x_forwarded_for).reverse! |
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# `Client-Ip` and `X-Forwarded-For` should not, generally, both be set. If they |
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# are both set, it means that either: |
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# |
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# 1) This request passed through two proxies with incompatible IP header |
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# conventions. |
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# |
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# 2) The client passed one of `Client-Ip` or `X-Forwarded-For` |
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# (whichever the proxy servers weren't using) themselves. |
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# |
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# Either way, there is no way for us to determine which header is the right one |
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# after the fact. Since we have no idea, if we are concerned about IP spoofing |
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# we need to give up and explode. (If you're not concerned about IP spoofing you |
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# can turn the `ip_spoofing_check` option off.) |
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should_check_ip = @check_ip && client_ips.last && forwarded_ips.last |
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if should_check_ip && !forwarded_ips.include?(client_ips.last) |
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# We don't know which came from the proxy, and which from the user |
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raise IpSpoofAttackError, "IP spoofing attack?! " \ |
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"HTTP_CLIENT_IP=#{@req.client_ip.inspect} " \ |
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"HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR=#{@req.x_forwarded_for.inspect}" |
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end |
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# NOTE: Mastodon addition to make sure we don't get requests from a non-trusted client |
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if @check_ip && (forwarded_ips.last || client_ips.last) && !@proxies.any? { |proxy| proxy === remote_addr } |
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raise IpSpoofAttackError, "IP spoofing attack?! client #{remote_addr} is not a trusted proxy " \ |
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"HTTP_CLIENT_IP=#{@req.client_ip.inspect} " \ |
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"HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR=#{@req.x_forwarded_for.inspect}" |
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end |
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# We assume these things about the IP headers: |
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# |
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# - X-Forwarded-For will be a list of IPs, one per proxy, or blank |
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# - Client-Ip is propagated from the outermost proxy, or is blank |
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# - REMOTE_ADDR will be the IP that made the request to Rack |
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ips = forwarded_ips + client_ips |
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ips.compact! |
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# If every single IP option is in the trusted list, return the IP that's |
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# furthest away |
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filter_proxies([remote_addr] + ips).first || ips.last || remote_addr |
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end |
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end |
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end |
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end |
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ActionDispatch::RemoteIp::GetIp.prepend(ActionDispatch::RemoteIp::GetIpExtensions) |
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# rubocop:enable all |
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