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1460 lines
51 KiB
1460 lines
51 KiB
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public |
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* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this |
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* file, You can obtain one at https://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. |
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* |
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* (c) ZeroTier, Inc. |
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* https://www.zerotier.com/ |
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*/ |
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#ifndef ZT_N_PACKET_HPP |
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#define ZT_N_PACKET_HPP |
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#include "AES.hpp" |
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#include "Address.hpp" |
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#include "Buffer.hpp" |
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#include "Constants.hpp" |
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#include "Identity.hpp" |
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#include "Poly1305.hpp" |
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#include "Salsa20.hpp" |
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#include "Utils.hpp" |
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#include <iostream> |
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#include <stdint.h> |
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#include <stdio.h> |
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#include <string.h> |
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#include <string> |
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/** |
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* Protocol version -- incremented only for major changes |
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* |
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* 1 - 0.2.0 ... 0.2.5 |
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* 2 - 0.3.0 ... 0.4.5 |
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* + Added signature and originating peer to multicast frame |
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* + Double size of multicast frame bloom filter |
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* 3 - 0.5.0 ... 0.6.0 |
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* + Yet another multicast redesign |
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* + New crypto completely changes key agreement cipher |
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* 4 - 0.6.0 ... 1.0.6 |
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* + BREAKING CHANGE: New identity format based on hashcash design |
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* 5 - 1.1.0 ... 1.1.5 |
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* + Supports echo |
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* + Supports in-band world (root server definition) updates |
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* + Clustering! (Though this will work with protocol v4 clients.) |
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* + Otherwise backward compatible with protocol v4 |
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* 6 - 1.1.5 ... 1.1.10 |
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* + Network configuration format revisions including binary values |
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* 7 - 1.1.10 ... 1.1.17 |
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* + Introduce trusted paths for local SDN use |
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* 8 - 1.1.17 ... 1.2.0 |
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* + Multipart network configurations for large network configs |
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* + Tags and Capabilities |
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* + Inline push of CertificateOfMembership deprecated |
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* 9 - 1.2.0 ... 1.2.14 |
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* 10 - 1.4.0 ... 1.4.6 |
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* 11 - 1.4.7 ... 1.4.8 |
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* + Multipath capability and load balancing (beta) |
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* 12 - 1.4.8 ... 1.16.0 |
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* + AES-GMAC-SIV backported for faster peer-to-peer crypto |
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* 13 - 1.16.0 ... CURRENT |
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* + Old deprecated "encrypted" flag removed |
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* + Ephemeral keying with second encryption pass to hide HELLO etc. |
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* + Encrypted HELLO packets to anyone but roots |
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* + Remove deprecated parsing of LAN announcements |
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*/ |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERSION 13 |
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/** |
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* Minimum supported protocol version |
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*/ |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERSION_MIN 4 |
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/** |
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* Maximum hop count allowed by packet structure (3 bits, 0-7) |
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* |
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* This is a protocol constant. It's the maximum allowed by the length |
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* of the hop counter -- three bits. See node/Constants.hpp for the |
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* pragmatic forwarding limit, which is typically lower. |
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*/ |
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#define ZT_PROTO_MAX_HOPS 7 |
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/** |
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* Cipher suite: Curve25519/Poly1305/Salsa20/12/NOCRYPT |
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* |
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* This specifies Poly1305 MAC using a 32-bit key derived from the first |
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* 32 bytes of a Salsa20/12 keystream as in the Salsa20/12 cipher suite, |
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* but the payload is not encrypted. This is currently only used to send |
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* HELLO since that's the public key specification packet and must be |
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* sent in the clear. Key agreement is performed using Curve25519 elliptic |
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* curve Diffie-Hellman. |
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*/ |
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#define ZT_PROTO_CIPHER_SUITE__C25519_POLY1305_NONE 0 |
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/** |
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* Cipher suite: Curve25519/Poly1305/Salsa20/12 |
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* |
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* This specifies Poly1305 using the first 32 bytes of a Salsa20/12 key |
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* stream as its one-time-use key followed by payload encryption with |
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* the remaining Salsa20/12 key stream. Key agreement is performed using |
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* Curve25519 elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman. |
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*/ |
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#define ZT_PROTO_CIPHER_SUITE__C25519_POLY1305_SALSA2012 1 |
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/** |
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* Cipher suite: NONE |
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* |
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* This differs from POLY1305/NONE in that *no* crypto is done, not even |
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* authentication. This is for trusted local LAN interconnects for internal |
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* SDN use within a data center. |
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* |
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* For this mode the MAC field becomes a trusted path ID and must match the |
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* configured ID of a trusted path or the packet is discarded. |
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*/ |
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#define ZT_PROTO_CIPHER_SUITE__NO_CRYPTO_TRUSTED_PATH 2 |
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/** |
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* AES-GMAC-SIV backported from 2.x |
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*/ |
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#define ZT_PROTO_CIPHER_SUITE__AES_GMAC_SIV 3 |
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/** |
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* AES-GMAC-SIV first of two keys |
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*/ |
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#define ZT_KBKDF_LABEL_AES_GMAC_SIV_K0 '0' |
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/** |
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* AES-GMAC-SIV second of two keys |
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*/ |
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#define ZT_KBKDF_LABEL_AES_GMAC_SIV_K1 '1' |
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/** |
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* Header flag indicating ephemeral keying and second encryption pass. |
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* |
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* If this is set, the packet will have an ephemeral key appended to it its payload |
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* will be encrypted with AES-CTR using this ephemeral key and the packet's header |
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* as an IV. |
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* |
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* Note that this is a reuse of a flag that has long been deprecated and ignored. |
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*/ |
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#define ZT_PROTO_FLAG_EXTENDED_ARMOR 0x80 |
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/** |
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* Header flag indicating that a packet is fragmented |
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* |
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* If this flag is set, the receiver knows to expect more than one fragment. |
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* See Packet::Fragment for details. |
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*/ |
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#define ZT_PROTO_FLAG_FRAGMENTED 0x40 |
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/** |
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* Verb flag indicating payload is compressed with LZ4 |
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*/ |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_FLAG_COMPRESSED 0x80 |
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/* |
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* Rounds used for deprecated Salsa20 encryption |
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*/ |
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#define ZT_PROTO_SALSA20_ROUNDS 12 |
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/** |
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* PUSH_DIRECT_PATHS flag: forget path |
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*/ |
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#define ZT_PUSH_DIRECT_PATHS_FLAG_FORGET_PATH 0x01 |
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/** |
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* PUSH_DIRECT_PATHS flag: cluster redirect |
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*/ |
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#define ZT_PUSH_DIRECT_PATHS_FLAG_CLUSTER_REDIRECT 0x02 |
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// Field indexes in packet header |
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#define ZT_PACKET_IDX_IV 0 |
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#define ZT_PACKET_IDX_DEST 8 |
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#define ZT_PACKET_IDX_SOURCE 13 |
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#define ZT_PACKET_IDX_FLAGS 18 |
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#define ZT_PACKET_IDX_MAC 19 |
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#define ZT_PACKET_IDX_VERB 27 |
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#define ZT_PACKET_IDX_PAYLOAD 28 |
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/** |
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* Index where extended armor encryption starts (right after flags, before MAC) |
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*/ |
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#define ZT_PACKET_IDX_EXTENDED_ARMOR_START ZT_PACKET_IDX_MAC |
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/** |
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* Packet buffer size (can be changed) |
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*/ |
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#define ZT_PROTO_MAX_PACKET_LENGTH (ZT_MAX_PACKET_FRAGMENTS * ZT_DEFAULT_PHYSMTU) |
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/** |
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* Minimum viable packet length (a.k.a. header length) |
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*/ |
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#define ZT_PROTO_MIN_PACKET_LENGTH ZT_PACKET_IDX_PAYLOAD |
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// Indexes of fields in fragment header |
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#define ZT_PACKET_FRAGMENT_IDX_PACKET_ID 0 |
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#define ZT_PACKET_FRAGMENT_IDX_DEST 8 |
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#define ZT_PACKET_FRAGMENT_IDX_FRAGMENT_INDICATOR 13 |
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#define ZT_PACKET_FRAGMENT_IDX_FRAGMENT_NO 14 |
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#define ZT_PACKET_FRAGMENT_IDX_HOPS 15 |
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#define ZT_PACKET_FRAGMENT_IDX_PAYLOAD 16 |
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/** |
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* Magic number found at ZT_PACKET_FRAGMENT_IDX_FRAGMENT_INDICATOR |
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*/ |
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#define ZT_PACKET_FRAGMENT_INDICATOR ZT_ADDRESS_RESERVED_PREFIX |
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/** |
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* Minimum viable fragment length |
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*/ |
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#define ZT_PROTO_MIN_FRAGMENT_LENGTH ZT_PACKET_FRAGMENT_IDX_PAYLOAD |
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// Field indices for parsing verbs ------------------------------------------- |
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// Some verbs have variable-length fields. Those aren't fully defined here |
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// yet-- instead they are parsed using relative indexes in IncomingPacket. |
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// See their respective handler functions. |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_HELLO_IDX_PROTOCOL_VERSION (ZT_PACKET_IDX_PAYLOAD) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_HELLO_IDX_MAJOR_VERSION (ZT_PROTO_VERB_HELLO_IDX_PROTOCOL_VERSION + 1) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_HELLO_IDX_MINOR_VERSION (ZT_PROTO_VERB_HELLO_IDX_MAJOR_VERSION + 1) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_HELLO_IDX_REVISION (ZT_PROTO_VERB_HELLO_IDX_MINOR_VERSION + 1) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_HELLO_IDX_TIMESTAMP (ZT_PROTO_VERB_HELLO_IDX_REVISION + 2) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_HELLO_IDX_IDENTITY (ZT_PROTO_VERB_HELLO_IDX_TIMESTAMP + 8) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_ERROR_IDX_IN_RE_VERB (ZT_PACKET_IDX_PAYLOAD) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_ERROR_IDX_IN_RE_PACKET_ID (ZT_PROTO_VERB_ERROR_IDX_IN_RE_VERB + 1) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_ERROR_IDX_ERROR_CODE (ZT_PROTO_VERB_ERROR_IDX_IN_RE_PACKET_ID + 8) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_ERROR_IDX_PAYLOAD (ZT_PROTO_VERB_ERROR_IDX_ERROR_CODE + 1) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_OK_IDX_IN_RE_VERB (ZT_PACKET_IDX_PAYLOAD) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_OK_IDX_IN_RE_PACKET_ID (ZT_PROTO_VERB_OK_IDX_IN_RE_VERB + 1) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_OK_IDX_PAYLOAD (ZT_PROTO_VERB_OK_IDX_IN_RE_PACKET_ID + 8) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_WHOIS_IDX_ZTADDRESS (ZT_PACKET_IDX_PAYLOAD) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_RENDEZVOUS_IDX_FLAGS (ZT_PACKET_IDX_PAYLOAD) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_RENDEZVOUS_IDX_ZTADDRESS (ZT_PROTO_VERB_RENDEZVOUS_IDX_FLAGS + 1) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_RENDEZVOUS_IDX_PORT (ZT_PROTO_VERB_RENDEZVOUS_IDX_ZTADDRESS + 5) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_RENDEZVOUS_IDX_ADDRLEN (ZT_PROTO_VERB_RENDEZVOUS_IDX_PORT + 2) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_RENDEZVOUS_IDX_ADDRESS (ZT_PROTO_VERB_RENDEZVOUS_IDX_ADDRLEN + 1) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_FRAME_IDX_NETWORK_ID (ZT_PACKET_IDX_PAYLOAD) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_FRAME_IDX_ETHERTYPE (ZT_PROTO_VERB_FRAME_IDX_NETWORK_ID + 8) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_FRAME_IDX_PAYLOAD (ZT_PROTO_VERB_FRAME_IDX_ETHERTYPE + 2) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_EXT_FRAME_IDX_NETWORK_ID (ZT_PACKET_IDX_PAYLOAD) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_EXT_FRAME_LEN_NETWORK_ID 8 |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_EXT_FRAME_IDX_FLAGS (ZT_PROTO_VERB_EXT_FRAME_IDX_NETWORK_ID + ZT_PROTO_VERB_EXT_FRAME_LEN_NETWORK_ID) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_EXT_FRAME_LEN_FLAGS 1 |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_EXT_FRAME_IDX_COM (ZT_PROTO_VERB_EXT_FRAME_IDX_FLAGS + ZT_PROTO_VERB_EXT_FRAME_LEN_FLAGS) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_EXT_FRAME_IDX_TO (ZT_PROTO_VERB_EXT_FRAME_IDX_FLAGS + ZT_PROTO_VERB_EXT_FRAME_LEN_FLAGS) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_EXT_FRAME_LEN_TO 6 |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_EXT_FRAME_IDX_FROM (ZT_PROTO_VERB_EXT_FRAME_IDX_TO + ZT_PROTO_VERB_EXT_FRAME_LEN_TO) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_EXT_FRAME_LEN_FROM 6 |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_EXT_FRAME_IDX_ETHERTYPE (ZT_PROTO_VERB_EXT_FRAME_IDX_FROM + ZT_PROTO_VERB_EXT_FRAME_LEN_FROM) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_EXT_FRAME_LEN_ETHERTYPE 2 |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_EXT_FRAME_IDX_PAYLOAD (ZT_PROTO_VERB_EXT_FRAME_IDX_ETHERTYPE + ZT_PROTO_VERB_EXT_FRAME_LEN_ETHERTYPE) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_NETWORK_CONFIG_REQUEST_IDX_NETWORK_ID (ZT_PACKET_IDX_PAYLOAD) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_NETWORK_CONFIG_REQUEST_IDX_DICT_LEN (ZT_PROTO_VERB_NETWORK_CONFIG_REQUEST_IDX_NETWORK_ID + 8) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_NETWORK_CONFIG_REQUEST_IDX_DICT (ZT_PROTO_VERB_NETWORK_CONFIG_REQUEST_IDX_DICT_LEN + 2) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_MULTICAST_GATHER_IDX_NETWORK_ID (ZT_PACKET_IDX_PAYLOAD) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_MULTICAST_GATHER_IDX_FLAGS (ZT_PROTO_VERB_MULTICAST_GATHER_IDX_NETWORK_ID + 8) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_MULTICAST_GATHER_IDX_MAC (ZT_PROTO_VERB_MULTICAST_GATHER_IDX_FLAGS + 1) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_MULTICAST_GATHER_IDX_ADI (ZT_PROTO_VERB_MULTICAST_GATHER_IDX_MAC + 6) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_MULTICAST_GATHER_IDX_GATHER_LIMIT (ZT_PROTO_VERB_MULTICAST_GATHER_IDX_ADI + 4) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_MULTICAST_GATHER_IDX_COM (ZT_PROTO_VERB_MULTICAST_GATHER_IDX_GATHER_LIMIT + 4) |
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// Note: COM, GATHER_LIMIT, and SOURCE_MAC are optional, and so are specified without size |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_MULTICAST_FRAME_IDX_NETWORK_ID (ZT_PACKET_IDX_PAYLOAD) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_MULTICAST_FRAME_IDX_FLAGS (ZT_PROTO_VERB_MULTICAST_FRAME_IDX_NETWORK_ID + 8) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_MULTICAST_FRAME_IDX_COM (ZT_PROTO_VERB_MULTICAST_FRAME_IDX_FLAGS + 1) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_MULTICAST_FRAME_IDX_GATHER_LIMIT (ZT_PROTO_VERB_MULTICAST_FRAME_IDX_FLAGS + 1) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_MULTICAST_FRAME_IDX_SOURCE_MAC (ZT_PROTO_VERB_MULTICAST_FRAME_IDX_FLAGS + 1) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_MULTICAST_FRAME_IDX_DEST_MAC (ZT_PROTO_VERB_MULTICAST_FRAME_IDX_FLAGS + 1) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_MULTICAST_FRAME_IDX_DEST_ADI (ZT_PROTO_VERB_MULTICAST_FRAME_IDX_DEST_MAC + 6) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_MULTICAST_FRAME_IDX_ETHERTYPE (ZT_PROTO_VERB_MULTICAST_FRAME_IDX_DEST_ADI + 4) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_MULTICAST_FRAME_IDX_FRAME (ZT_PROTO_VERB_MULTICAST_FRAME_IDX_ETHERTYPE + 2) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_HELLO__OK__IDX_TIMESTAMP (ZT_PROTO_VERB_OK_IDX_PAYLOAD) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_HELLO__OK__IDX_PROTOCOL_VERSION (ZT_PROTO_VERB_HELLO__OK__IDX_TIMESTAMP + 8) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_HELLO__OK__IDX_MAJOR_VERSION (ZT_PROTO_VERB_HELLO__OK__IDX_PROTOCOL_VERSION + 1) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_HELLO__OK__IDX_MINOR_VERSION (ZT_PROTO_VERB_HELLO__OK__IDX_MAJOR_VERSION + 1) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_HELLO__OK__IDX_REVISION (ZT_PROTO_VERB_HELLO__OK__IDX_MINOR_VERSION + 1) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_WHOIS__OK__IDX_IDENTITY (ZT_PROTO_VERB_OK_IDX_PAYLOAD) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_NETWORK_CONFIG_REQUEST__OK__IDX_NETWORK_ID (ZT_PROTO_VERB_OK_IDX_PAYLOAD) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_NETWORK_CONFIG_REQUEST__OK__IDX_DICT_LEN (ZT_PROTO_VERB_NETWORK_CONFIG_REQUEST__OK__IDX_NETWORK_ID + 8) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_NETWORK_CONFIG_REQUEST__OK__IDX_DICT (ZT_PROTO_VERB_NETWORK_CONFIG_REQUEST__OK__IDX_DICT_LEN + 2) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_MULTICAST_GATHER__OK__IDX_NETWORK_ID (ZT_PROTO_VERB_OK_IDX_PAYLOAD) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_MULTICAST_GATHER__OK__IDX_MAC (ZT_PROTO_VERB_MULTICAST_GATHER__OK__IDX_NETWORK_ID + 8) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_MULTICAST_GATHER__OK__IDX_ADI (ZT_PROTO_VERB_MULTICAST_GATHER__OK__IDX_MAC + 6) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_MULTICAST_GATHER__OK__IDX_GATHER_RESULTS (ZT_PROTO_VERB_MULTICAST_GATHER__OK__IDX_ADI + 4) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_MULTICAST_FRAME__OK__IDX_NETWORK_ID (ZT_PROTO_VERB_OK_IDX_PAYLOAD) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_MULTICAST_FRAME__OK__IDX_MAC (ZT_PROTO_VERB_MULTICAST_FRAME__OK__IDX_NETWORK_ID + 8) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_MULTICAST_FRAME__OK__IDX_ADI (ZT_PROTO_VERB_MULTICAST_FRAME__OK__IDX_MAC + 6) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_MULTICAST_FRAME__OK__IDX_FLAGS (ZT_PROTO_VERB_MULTICAST_FRAME__OK__IDX_ADI + 4) |
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#define ZT_PROTO_VERB_MULTICAST_FRAME__OK__IDX_COM_AND_GATHER_RESULTS (ZT_PROTO_VERB_MULTICAST_FRAME__OK__IDX_FLAGS + 1) |
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// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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namespace ZeroTier { |
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/** |
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* ZeroTier packet |
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* |
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* Packet format: |
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* <[8] 64-bit packet ID / crypto IV / packet counter> |
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* <[5] destination ZT address> |
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* <[5] source ZT address> |
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* <[1] flags/cipher/hops> |
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* <[8] 64-bit MAC (or trusted path ID in trusted path mode)> |
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* [... -- begin encryption envelope -- ...] |
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* <[1] encrypted flags (MS 3 bits) and verb (LS 5 bits)> |
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* [... verb-specific payload ...] |
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* |
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* Packets smaller than 28 bytes are invalid and silently discarded. |
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* |
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* The 64-bit packet ID is a strongly random value used as a crypto IV. |
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* Its least significant 3 bits are also used as a monotonically increasing |
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* (and looping) counter for sending packets to a particular recipient. This |
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* can be used for link quality monitoring and reporting and has no crypto |
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* impact as it does not increase the likelihood of an IV collision. (The |
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* crypto we use is not sensitive to the nature of the IV, only that it does |
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* not repeat.) |
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* |
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* The flags/cipher/hops bit field is: FFCCCHHH where C is a 3-bit cipher |
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* selection allowing up to 7 cipher suites, F is outside-envelope flags, |
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* and H is hop count. |
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* |
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* The three-bit hop count is the only part of a packet that is mutable in |
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* transit without invalidating the MAC. All other bits in the packet are |
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* immutable. This is because intermediate nodes can increment the hop |
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* count up to 7 (protocol max). |
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* |
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* For unencrypted packets, MAC is computed on plaintext. Only HELLO is ever |
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* sent in the clear, as it's the "here is my public key" message. |
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*/ |
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class Packet : public Buffer<ZT_PROTO_MAX_PACKET_LENGTH> { |
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public: |
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/** |
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* A packet fragment |
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* |
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* Fragments are sent if a packet is larger than UDP MTU. The first fragment |
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* is sent with its normal header with the fragmented flag set. Remaining |
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* fragments are sent this way. |
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* |
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* The fragmented bit indicates that there is at least one fragment. Fragments |
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* themselves contain the total, so the receiver must "learn" this from the |
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* first fragment it receives. |
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* |
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* Fragments are sent with the following format: |
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* <[8] packet ID of packet whose fragment this belongs to> |
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* <[5] destination ZT address> |
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* <[1] 0xff, a reserved address, signals that this isn't a normal packet> |
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* <[1] total fragments (most significant 4 bits), fragment no (LS 4 bits)> |
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* <[1] ZT hop count (top 5 bits unused and must be zero)> |
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* <[...] fragment data> |
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* |
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* The protocol supports a maximum of 16 fragments. If a fragment is received |
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* before its main packet header, it should be cached for a brief period of |
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* time to see if its parent arrives. Loss of any fragment constitutes packet |
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* loss; there is no retransmission mechanism. The receiver must wait for full |
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* receipt to authenticate and decrypt; there is no per-fragment MAC. (But if |
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* fragments are corrupt, the MAC will fail for the whole assembled packet.) |
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*/ |
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class Fragment : public Buffer<ZT_PROTO_MAX_PACKET_LENGTH> { |
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public: |
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Fragment() : Buffer<ZT_PROTO_MAX_PACKET_LENGTH>() |
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{ |
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} |
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template <unsigned int C2> Fragment(const Buffer<C2>& b) : Buffer<ZT_PROTO_MAX_PACKET_LENGTH>(b) |
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{ |
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} |
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Fragment(const void* data, unsigned int len) : Buffer<ZT_PROTO_MAX_PACKET_LENGTH>(data, len) |
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{ |
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} |
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/** |
|
* Initialize from a packet |
|
* |
|
* @param p Original assembled packet |
|
* @param fragStart Start of fragment (raw index in packet data) |
|
* @param fragLen Length of fragment in bytes |
|
* @param fragNo Which fragment (>= 1, since 0 is Packet with end chopped off) |
|
* @param fragTotal Total number of fragments (including 0) |
|
*/ |
|
Fragment(const Packet& p, unsigned int fragStart, unsigned int fragLen, unsigned int fragNo, unsigned int fragTotal) |
|
{ |
|
init(p, fragStart, fragLen, fragNo, fragTotal); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* Initialize from a packet |
|
* |
|
* @param p Original assembled packet |
|
* @param fragStart Start of fragment (raw index in packet data) |
|
* @param fragLen Length of fragment in bytes |
|
* @param fragNo Which fragment (>= 1, since 0 is Packet with end chopped off) |
|
* @param fragTotal Total number of fragments (including 0) |
|
*/ |
|
inline void init(const Packet& p, unsigned int fragStart, unsigned int fragLen, unsigned int fragNo, unsigned int fragTotal) |
|
{ |
|
if ((fragStart + fragLen) > p.size()) { |
|
throw ZT_EXCEPTION_OUT_OF_BOUNDS; |
|
} |
|
setSize(fragLen + ZT_PROTO_MIN_FRAGMENT_LENGTH); |
|
|
|
// NOTE: this copies both the IV/packet ID and the destination address. |
|
memcpy(field(ZT_PACKET_FRAGMENT_IDX_PACKET_ID, 13), p.field(ZT_PACKET_IDX_IV, 13), 13); |
|
|
|
(*this)[ZT_PACKET_FRAGMENT_IDX_FRAGMENT_INDICATOR] = ZT_PACKET_FRAGMENT_INDICATOR; |
|
(*this)[ZT_PACKET_FRAGMENT_IDX_FRAGMENT_NO] = (char)(((fragTotal & 0xf) << 4) | (fragNo & 0xf)); |
|
(*this)[ZT_PACKET_FRAGMENT_IDX_HOPS] = 0; |
|
|
|
memcpy(field(ZT_PACKET_FRAGMENT_IDX_PAYLOAD, fragLen), p.field(fragStart, fragLen), fragLen); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* Get this fragment's destination |
|
* |
|
* @return Destination ZT address |
|
*/ |
|
inline Address destination() const |
|
{ |
|
return Address(field(ZT_PACKET_FRAGMENT_IDX_DEST, ZT_ADDRESS_LENGTH), ZT_ADDRESS_LENGTH); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* @return True if fragment is of a valid length |
|
*/ |
|
inline bool lengthValid() const |
|
{ |
|
return (size() >= ZT_PACKET_FRAGMENT_IDX_PAYLOAD); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* @return ID of packet this is a fragment of |
|
*/ |
|
inline uint64_t packetId() const |
|
{ |
|
return at<uint64_t>(ZT_PACKET_FRAGMENT_IDX_PACKET_ID); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* @return Total number of fragments in packet |
|
*/ |
|
inline unsigned int totalFragments() const |
|
{ |
|
return (((unsigned int)((*this)[ZT_PACKET_FRAGMENT_IDX_FRAGMENT_NO]) >> 4) & 0xf); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* @return Fragment number of this fragment |
|
*/ |
|
inline unsigned int fragmentNumber() const |
|
{ |
|
return ((unsigned int)((*this)[ZT_PACKET_FRAGMENT_IDX_FRAGMENT_NO]) & 0xf); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* @return Fragment ZT hop count |
|
*/ |
|
inline unsigned int hops() const |
|
{ |
|
return (unsigned int)((*this)[ZT_PACKET_FRAGMENT_IDX_HOPS]); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* Increment this packet's hop count |
|
*/ |
|
inline void incrementHops() |
|
{ |
|
(*this)[ZT_PACKET_FRAGMENT_IDX_HOPS] = (((*this)[ZT_PACKET_FRAGMENT_IDX_HOPS]) + 1) & ZT_PROTO_MAX_HOPS; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* @return Length of payload in bytes |
|
*/ |
|
inline unsigned int payloadLength() const |
|
{ |
|
return ((size() > ZT_PACKET_FRAGMENT_IDX_PAYLOAD) ? (size() - ZT_PACKET_FRAGMENT_IDX_PAYLOAD) : 0); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* @return Raw packet payload |
|
*/ |
|
inline const unsigned char* payload() const |
|
{ |
|
return field(ZT_PACKET_FRAGMENT_IDX_PAYLOAD, size() - ZT_PACKET_FRAGMENT_IDX_PAYLOAD); |
|
} |
|
}; |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* ZeroTier protocol verbs |
|
*/ |
|
enum Verb /* Max value: 32 (5 bits) */ |
|
{ |
|
/** |
|
* No operation (ignored, no reply) |
|
*/ |
|
VERB_NOP = 0x00, |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* Announcement of a node's existence and vitals: |
|
* <[1] protocol version> |
|
* <[1] software major version> |
|
* <[1] software minor version> |
|
* <[2] software revision> |
|
* <[8] timestamp for determining latency> |
|
* <[...] binary serialized identity (see Identity)> |
|
* <[...] physical destination address of packet> |
|
* <[8] 64-bit world ID of current planet> |
|
* <[8] 64-bit timestamp of current planet> |
|
* [... remainder if packet is encrypted using cryptField() ...] |
|
* <[2] 16-bit number of moons> |
|
* [<[1] 8-bit type ID of moon>] |
|
* [<[8] 64-bit world ID of moon>] |
|
* [<[8] 64-bit timestamp of moon>] |
|
* [... additional moon type/ID/timestamp tuples ...] |
|
* |
|
* HELLO is sent in the clear as it is how peers share their identity |
|
* public keys. A few additional fields are sent in the clear too, but |
|
* these are things that are public info or are easy to determine. As |
|
* of 1.2.0 we have added a few more fields, but since these could have |
|
* the potential to be sensitive we introduced the encryption of the |
|
* remainder of the packet. See cryptField(). Packet MAC is still |
|
* performed of course, so authentication occurs as normal. |
|
* |
|
* Destination address is the actual wire address to which the packet |
|
* was sent. See InetAddress::serialize() for format. |
|
* |
|
* OK payload: |
|
* <[8] HELLO timestamp field echo> |
|
* <[1] protocol version> |
|
* <[1] software major version> |
|
* <[1] software minor version> |
|
* <[2] software revision> |
|
* <[...] physical destination address of packet> |
|
* <[2] 16-bit length of world update(s) or 0 if none> |
|
* [[...] updates to planets and/or moons] |
|
* |
|
* With the exception of the timestamp, the other fields pertain to the |
|
* respondent who is sending OK and are not echoes. |
|
* |
|
* Note that OK is fully encrypted so no selective cryptField() of |
|
* potentially sensitive fields is needed. |
|
* |
|
* ERROR has no payload. |
|
*/ |
|
VERB_HELLO = 0x01, |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* Error response: |
|
* <[1] in-re verb> |
|
* <[8] in-re packet ID> |
|
* <[1] error code> |
|
* <[...] error-dependent payload> |
|
*/ |
|
VERB_ERROR = 0x02, |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* Success response: |
|
* <[1] in-re verb> |
|
* <[8] in-re packet ID> |
|
* <[...] request-specific payload> |
|
*/ |
|
VERB_OK = 0x03, |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* Query an identity by address: |
|
* <[5] address to look up> |
|
* [<[...] additional addresses to look up> |
|
* |
|
* OK response payload: |
|
* <[...] binary serialized identity> |
|
* [<[...] additional binary serialized identities>] |
|
* |
|
* If querying a cluster, duplicate OK responses may occasionally occur. |
|
* These must be tolerated, which is easy since they'll have info you |
|
* already have. |
|
* |
|
* If the address is not found, no response is generated. The semantics |
|
* of WHOIS is similar to ARP and NDP in that persistent retrying can |
|
* be performed. |
|
*/ |
|
VERB_WHOIS = 0x04, |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* Relay-mediated NAT traversal or firewall punching initiation: |
|
* <[1] flags (unused, currently 0)> |
|
* <[5] ZeroTier address of peer that might be found at this address> |
|
* <[2] 16-bit protocol address port> |
|
* <[1] protocol address length (4 for IPv4, 16 for IPv6)> |
|
* <[...] protocol address (network byte order)> |
|
* |
|
* An upstream node can send this to inform both sides of a relay of |
|
* information they might use to establish a direct connection. |
|
* |
|
* Upon receipt a peer sends HELLO to establish a direct link. |
|
* |
|
* No OK or ERROR is generated. |
|
*/ |
|
VERB_RENDEZVOUS = 0x05, |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* ZT-to-ZT unicast ethernet frame (shortened EXT_FRAME): |
|
* <[8] 64-bit network ID> |
|
* <[2] 16-bit ethertype> |
|
* <[...] ethernet payload> |
|
* |
|
* MAC addresses are derived from the packet's source and destination |
|
* ZeroTier addresses. This is a shortened EXT_FRAME that elides full |
|
* Ethernet framing and other optional flags and features when they |
|
* are not necessary. |
|
* |
|
* ERROR may be generated if a membership certificate is needed for a |
|
* closed network. Payload will be network ID. |
|
*/ |
|
VERB_FRAME = 0x06, |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* Full Ethernet frame with MAC addressing and optional fields: |
|
* <[8] 64-bit network ID> |
|
* <[1] flags> |
|
* <[6] destination MAC or all zero for destination node> |
|
* <[6] source MAC or all zero for node of origin> |
|
* <[2] 16-bit ethertype> |
|
* <[...] ethernet payload> |
|
* |
|
* Flags: |
|
* 0x01 - Certificate of network membership attached (DEPRECATED) |
|
* 0x02 - Most significant bit of subtype (see below) |
|
* 0x04 - Middle bit of subtype (see below) |
|
* 0x08 - Least significant bit of subtype (see below) |
|
* 0x10 - ACK requested in the form of OK(EXT_FRAME) |
|
* |
|
* Subtypes (0..7): |
|
* 0x0 - Normal frame (bridging can be determined by checking MAC) |
|
* 0x1 - TEEd outbound frame |
|
* 0x2 - REDIRECTed outbound frame |
|
* 0x3 - WATCHed outbound frame (TEE with ACK, ACK bit also set) |
|
* 0x4 - TEEd inbound frame |
|
* 0x5 - REDIRECTed inbound frame |
|
* 0x6 - WATCHed inbound frame |
|
* 0x7 - (reserved for future use) |
|
* |
|
* An extended frame carries full MAC addressing, making it a |
|
* superset of VERB_FRAME. It is used for bridged traffic, |
|
* redirected or observed traffic via rules, and can in theory |
|
* be used for multicast though MULTICAST_FRAME exists for that |
|
* purpose and has additional options and capabilities. |
|
* |
|
* OK payload (if ACK flag is set): |
|
* <[8] 64-bit network ID> |
|
*/ |
|
VERB_EXT_FRAME = 0x07, |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* ECHO request (a.k.a. ping): |
|
* <[...] arbitrary payload> |
|
* |
|
* This generates OK with a copy of the transmitted payload. No ERROR |
|
* is generated. Response to ECHO requests is optional and ECHO may be |
|
* ignored if a node detects a possible flood. |
|
*/ |
|
VERB_ECHO = 0x08, |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* Announce interest in multicast group(s): |
|
* <[8] 64-bit network ID> |
|
* <[6] multicast Ethernet address> |
|
* <[4] multicast additional distinguishing information (ADI)> |
|
* [... additional tuples of network/address/adi ...] |
|
* |
|
* LIKEs may be sent to any peer, though a good implementation should |
|
* restrict them to peers on the same network they're for and to network |
|
* controllers and root servers. In the current network, root servers |
|
* will provide the service of final multicast cache. |
|
* |
|
* VERB_NETWORK_CREDENTIALS should be pushed along with this, especially |
|
* if using upstream (e.g. root) nodes as multicast databases. This allows |
|
* GATHERs to be authenticated. |
|
* |
|
* OK/ERROR are not generated. |
|
*/ |
|
VERB_MULTICAST_LIKE = 0x09, |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* Network credentials push: |
|
* [<[...] one or more certificates of membership>] |
|
* <[1] 0x00, null byte marking end of COM array> |
|
* <[2] 16-bit number of capabilities> |
|
* <[...] one or more serialized Capability> |
|
* <[2] 16-bit number of tags> |
|
* <[...] one or more serialized Tags> |
|
* <[2] 16-bit number of revocations> |
|
* <[...] one or more serialized Revocations> |
|
* <[2] 16-bit number of certificates of ownership> |
|
* <[...] one or more serialized CertificateOfOwnership> |
|
* |
|
* This can be sent by anyone at any time to push network credentials. |
|
* These will of course only be accepted if they are properly signed. |
|
* Credentials can be for any number of networks. |
|
* |
|
* The use of a zero byte to terminate the COM section is for legacy |
|
* backward compatibility. Newer fields are prefixed with a length. |
|
* |
|
* OK/ERROR are not generated. |
|
*/ |
|
VERB_NETWORK_CREDENTIALS = 0x0a, |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* Network configuration request: |
|
* <[8] 64-bit network ID> |
|
* <[2] 16-bit length of request meta-data dictionary> |
|
* <[...] string-serialized request meta-data> |
|
* <[8] 64-bit revision of netconf we currently have> |
|
* <[8] 64-bit timestamp of netconf we currently have> |
|
* |
|
* This message requests network configuration from a node capable of |
|
* providing it. |
|
* |
|
* Responses to this are always whole configs intended for the recipient. |
|
* For patches and other updates a NETWORK_CONFIG is sent instead. |
|
* |
|
* It would be valid and correct as of 1.2.0 to use NETWORK_CONFIG always, |
|
* but OK(NETWORK_CONFIG_REQUEST) should be sent for compatibility. |
|
* |
|
* OK response payload: |
|
* <[8] 64-bit network ID> |
|
* <[2] 16-bit length of network configuration dictionary chunk> |
|
* <[...] network configuration dictionary (may be incomplete)> |
|
* [ ... end of legacy single chunk response ... ] |
|
* <[1] 8-bit flags> |
|
* <[8] 64-bit config update ID (should never be 0)> |
|
* <[4] 32-bit total length of assembled dictionary> |
|
* <[4] 32-bit index of chunk> |
|
* [ ... end signed portion ... ] |
|
* <[1] 8-bit chunk signature type> |
|
* <[2] 16-bit length of chunk signature> |
|
* <[...] chunk signature> |
|
* |
|
* The chunk signature signs the entire payload of the OK response. |
|
* Currently only one signature type is supported: ed25519 (1). |
|
* |
|
* Each config chunk is signed to prevent memory exhaustion or |
|
* traffic crowding DOS attacks against config fragment assembly. |
|
* |
|
* If the packet is from the network controller it is permitted to end |
|
* before the config update ID or other chunking related or signature |
|
* fields. This is to support older controllers that don't include |
|
* these fields and may be removed in the future. |
|
* |
|
* ERROR response payload: |
|
* <[8] 64-bit network ID> |
|
* <[2] 16-bit length of error-related data (optional)> |
|
* <[...] error-related data (optional)> |
|
* |
|
* Error related data is a Dictionary containing things like a URL |
|
* for authentication or a human-readable error message, and is |
|
* optional and may be absent or empty. |
|
*/ |
|
VERB_NETWORK_CONFIG_REQUEST = 0x0b, |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* Network configuration data push: |
|
* <[8] 64-bit network ID> |
|
* <[2] 16-bit length of network configuration dictionary chunk> |
|
* <[...] network configuration dictionary (may be incomplete)> |
|
* <[1] 8-bit flags> |
|
* <[8] 64-bit config update ID (should never be 0)> |
|
* <[4] 32-bit total length of assembled dictionary> |
|
* <[4] 32-bit index of chunk> |
|
* [ ... end signed portion ... ] |
|
* <[1] 8-bit chunk signature type> |
|
* <[2] 16-bit length of chunk signature> |
|
* <[...] chunk signature> |
|
* |
|
* This is a direct push variant for network config updates. It otherwise |
|
* carries the same payload as OK(NETWORK_CONFIG_REQUEST) and has the same |
|
* semantics. |
|
* |
|
* The legacy mode missing the additional chunking fields is not supported |
|
* here. |
|
* |
|
* Flags: |
|
* 0x01 - Use fast propagation |
|
* |
|
* An OK should be sent if the config is successfully received and |
|
* accepted. |
|
* |
|
* OK payload: |
|
* <[8] 64-bit network ID> |
|
* <[8] 64-bit config update ID> |
|
*/ |
|
VERB_NETWORK_CONFIG = 0x0c, |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* Request endpoints for multicast distribution: |
|
* <[8] 64-bit network ID> |
|
* <[1] flags> |
|
* <[6] MAC address of multicast group being queried> |
|
* <[4] 32-bit ADI for multicast group being queried> |
|
* <[4] 32-bit requested max number of multicast peers> |
|
* [<[...] network certificate of membership>] |
|
* |
|
* Flags: |
|
* 0x01 - COM is attached |
|
* |
|
* This message asks a peer for additional known endpoints that have |
|
* LIKEd a given multicast group. It's sent when the sender wishes |
|
* to send multicast but does not have the desired number of recipient |
|
* peers. |
|
* |
|
* More than one OK response can occur if the response is broken up across |
|
* multiple packets or if querying a clustered node. |
|
* |
|
* The COM should be included so that upstream nodes that are not |
|
* members of our network can validate our request. |
|
* |
|
* OK response payload: |
|
* <[8] 64-bit network ID> |
|
* <[6] MAC address of multicast group being queried> |
|
* <[4] 32-bit ADI for multicast group being queried> |
|
* [begin gather results -- these same fields can be in OK(MULTICAST_FRAME)] |
|
* <[4] 32-bit total number of known members in this multicast group> |
|
* <[2] 16-bit number of members enumerated in this packet> |
|
* <[...] series of 5-byte ZeroTier addresses of enumerated members> |
|
* |
|
* ERROR is not generated; queries that return no response are dropped. |
|
*/ |
|
VERB_MULTICAST_GATHER = 0x0d, |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* Multicast frame: |
|
* <[8] 64-bit network ID> |
|
* <[1] flags> |
|
* [<[4] 32-bit implicit gather limit>] |
|
* [<[6] source MAC>] |
|
* <[6] destination MAC (multicast address)> |
|
* <[4] 32-bit multicast ADI (multicast address extension)> |
|
* <[2] 16-bit ethertype> |
|
* <[...] ethernet payload> |
|
* |
|
* Flags: |
|
* 0x01 - Network certificate of membership attached (DEPRECATED) |
|
* 0x02 - Implicit gather limit field is present |
|
* 0x04 - Source MAC is specified -- otherwise it's computed from sender |
|
* 0x08 - Please replicate (sent to multicast replicators) |
|
* |
|
* OK and ERROR responses are optional. OK may be generated if there are |
|
* implicit gather results or if the recipient wants to send its own |
|
* updated certificate of network membership to the sender. ERROR may be |
|
* generated if a certificate is needed or if multicasts to this group |
|
* are no longer wanted (multicast unsubscribe). |
|
* |
|
* OK response payload: |
|
* <[8] 64-bit network ID> |
|
* <[6] MAC address of multicast group> |
|
* <[4] 32-bit ADI for multicast group> |
|
* <[1] flags> |
|
* [<[...] network certificate of membership (DEPRECATED)>] |
|
* [<[...] implicit gather results if flag 0x01 is set>] |
|
* |
|
* OK flags (same bits as request flags): |
|
* 0x01 - OK includes certificate of network membership (DEPRECATED) |
|
* 0x02 - OK includes implicit gather results |
|
* |
|
* ERROR response payload: |
|
* <[8] 64-bit network ID> |
|
* <[6] multicast group MAC> |
|
* <[4] 32-bit multicast group ADI> |
|
*/ |
|
VERB_MULTICAST_FRAME = 0x0e, |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* Push of potential endpoints for direct communication: |
|
* <[2] 16-bit number of paths> |
|
* <[...] paths> |
|
* |
|
* Path record format: |
|
* <[1] 8-bit path flags> |
|
* <[2] length of extended path characteristics or 0 for none> |
|
* <[...] extended path characteristics> |
|
* <[1] address type> |
|
* <[1] address length in bytes> |
|
* <[...] address> |
|
* |
|
* Path record flags: |
|
* 0x01 - Forget this path if currently known (not implemented yet) |
|
* 0x02 - Cluster redirect -- use this in preference to others |
|
* |
|
* The receiver may, upon receiving a push, attempt to establish a |
|
* direct link to one or more of the indicated addresses. It is the |
|
* responsibility of the sender to limit which peers it pushes direct |
|
* paths to to those with whom it has a trust relationship. The receiver |
|
* must obey any restrictions provided such as exclusivity or blacklists. |
|
* OK responses to this message are optional. |
|
* |
|
* Note that a direct path push does not imply that learned paths can't |
|
* be used unless they are blacklisted explicitly or unless flag 0x01 |
|
* is set. |
|
* |
|
* OK and ERROR are not generated. |
|
*/ |
|
VERB_PUSH_DIRECT_PATHS = 0x10, |
|
|
|
// 0x11 -- deprecated |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* An acknowledgment of receipt of a series of recent packets from another |
|
* peer. This is used to calculate relative throughput values and to detect |
|
* packet loss. Only VERB_FRAME and VERB_EXT_FRAME packets are counted. |
|
* |
|
* ACK response format: |
|
* <[4] 32-bit number of bytes received since last ACK> |
|
* |
|
* Upon receipt of this packet, the local peer will verify that the correct |
|
* number of bytes were received by the remote peer. If these values do |
|
* not agree that could be an indication of packet loss. |
|
* |
|
* Additionally, the local peer knows the interval of time that has |
|
* elapsed since the last received ACK. With this information it can compute |
|
* a rough estimate of the current throughput. |
|
* |
|
* This is sent at a maximum rate of once per every ZT_QOS_ACK_INTERVAL |
|
*/ |
|
VERB_ACK = 0x12, |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* A packet containing timing measurements useful for estimating path quality. |
|
* Composed of a list of <packet ID:internal sojourn time> pairs for an |
|
* arbitrary set of recent packets. This is used to sample for latency and |
|
* packet delay variance (PDV, "jitter"). |
|
* |
|
* QoS record format: |
|
* |
|
* <[8] 64-bit packet ID of previously-received packet> |
|
* <[1] 8-bit packet sojourn time> |
|
* <...repeat until end of max 1400 byte packet...> |
|
* |
|
* The number of possible records per QoS packet is: (1400 * 8) / 72 = 155 |
|
* This packet should be sent very rarely (every few seconds) as it can be |
|
* somewhat large if the connection is saturated. Future versions might use |
|
* a bloom table to probabilistically determine these values in a vastly |
|
* more space-efficient manner. |
|
* |
|
* Note: The 'internal packet sojourn time' is a slight misnomer as it is a |
|
* measure of the amount of time between when a packet was received and the |
|
* egress time of its tracking QoS packet. |
|
* |
|
* This is sent at a maximum rate of once per every |
|
* ZT_QOS_MEASUREMENT_INTERVAL |
|
*/ |
|
VERB_QOS_MEASUREMENT = 0x13, |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* A message with arbitrary user-definable content: |
|
* <[8] 64-bit arbitrary message type ID> |
|
* [<[...] message payload>] |
|
* |
|
* This can be used to send arbitrary messages over VL1. It generates no |
|
* OK or ERROR and has no special semantics outside of whatever the user |
|
* (via the ZeroTier core API) chooses to give it. |
|
* |
|
* Message type IDs less than or equal to 65535 are reserved for use by |
|
* ZeroTier, Inc. itself. We recommend making up random ones for your own |
|
* implementations. |
|
*/ |
|
VERB_USER_MESSAGE = 0x14, |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* A trace for remote debugging or diagnostics: |
|
* <[...] null-terminated dictionary containing trace information> |
|
* [<[...] additional null-terminated dictionaries>] |
|
* |
|
* This message contains a remote trace event. Remote trace events can |
|
* be sent to observers configured at the network level for those that |
|
* pertain directly to activity on a network, or to global observers if |
|
* locally configured. |
|
* |
|
* The instance ID is a random 64-bit value generated by each ZeroTier |
|
* node on startup. This is helpful in identifying traces from different |
|
* members of a cluster. |
|
*/ |
|
VERB_REMOTE_TRACE = 0x15, |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* A request to a peer to use a specific path in a multi-path scenario: |
|
* <[2] 16-bit unsigned integer that encodes a path choice utility> |
|
* |
|
* This is sent when a node operating in multipath mode observes that |
|
* its inbound and outbound traffic aren't going over the same path. The |
|
* node will compute its perceived utility for using its chosen outbound |
|
* path and send this to a peer in an attempt to petition it to send |
|
* its traffic over this same path. |
|
* |
|
* Scenarios: |
|
* |
|
* (1) Remote peer utility is GREATER than ours: |
|
* - Remote peer will refuse the petition and continue using current path |
|
* (2) Remote peer utility is LESS than than ours: |
|
* - Remote peer will accept the petition and switch to our chosen path |
|
* (3) Remote peer utility is EQUAL to our own: |
|
* - To prevent confusion and flapping, both side will agree to use the |
|
* numerical values of their identities to determine which path to use. |
|
* The peer with the greatest identity will win. |
|
* |
|
* If a node petitions a peer repeatedly with no effect it will regard |
|
* that as a refusal by the remote peer, in this case if the utility is |
|
* negligible it will voluntarily switch to the remote peer's chosen path. |
|
*/ |
|
VERB_PATH_NEGOTIATION_REQUEST = 0x16 |
|
}; |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* Error codes for VERB_ERROR |
|
*/ |
|
enum ErrorCode { |
|
/* No error, not actually used in transit */ |
|
ERROR_NONE = 0x00, |
|
|
|
/* Invalid request */ |
|
ERROR_INVALID_REQUEST = 0x01, |
|
|
|
/* Bad/unsupported protocol version */ |
|
ERROR_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION = 0x02, |
|
|
|
/* Unknown object queried */ |
|
ERROR_OBJ_NOT_FOUND = 0x03, |
|
|
|
/* HELLO pushed an identity whose address is already claimed */ |
|
ERROR_IDENTITY_COLLISION = 0x04, |
|
|
|
/* Verb or use case not supported/enabled by this node */ |
|
ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION = 0x05, |
|
|
|
/* Network membership certificate update needed */ |
|
ERROR_NEED_MEMBERSHIP_CERTIFICATE = 0x06, |
|
|
|
/* Tried to join network, but you're not a member */ |
|
ERROR_NETWORK_ACCESS_DENIED_ = 0x07, /* extra _ at end to avoid Windows name conflict */ |
|
|
|
/* Multicasts to this group are not wanted */ |
|
ERROR_UNWANTED_MULTICAST = 0x08, |
|
|
|
/* Network requires external or 2FA authentication (e.g. SSO). */ |
|
ERROR_NETWORK_AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED = 0x09 |
|
}; |
|
|
|
template <unsigned int C2> Packet(const Buffer<C2>& b) : Buffer<ZT_PROTO_MAX_PACKET_LENGTH>(b) |
|
{ |
|
} |
|
|
|
Packet(const void* data, unsigned int len) : Buffer<ZT_PROTO_MAX_PACKET_LENGTH>(data, len) |
|
{ |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* Construct a new empty packet with a unique random packet ID |
|
* |
|
* Flags and hops will be zero. Other fields and data region are undefined. |
|
* Use the header access methods (setDestination() and friends) to fill out |
|
* the header. Payload should be appended; initial size is header size. |
|
*/ |
|
Packet() : Buffer<ZT_PROTO_MAX_PACKET_LENGTH>(ZT_PROTO_MIN_PACKET_LENGTH) |
|
{ |
|
Utils::getSecureRandom(field(ZT_PACKET_IDX_IV, 8), 8); |
|
(*this)[ZT_PACKET_IDX_FLAGS] = 0; // zero flags, cipher ID, and hops |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* Make a copy of a packet with a new initialization vector and destination address |
|
* |
|
* This can be used to take one draft prototype packet and quickly make copies to |
|
* encrypt for different destinations. |
|
* |
|
* @param prototype Prototype packet |
|
* @param dest Destination ZeroTier address for new packet |
|
*/ |
|
Packet(const Packet& prototype, const Address& dest) : Buffer<ZT_PROTO_MAX_PACKET_LENGTH>(prototype) |
|
{ |
|
Utils::getSecureRandom(field(ZT_PACKET_IDX_IV, 8), 8); |
|
setDestination(dest); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* Construct a new empty packet with a unique random packet ID |
|
* |
|
* @param dest Destination ZT address |
|
* @param source Source ZT address |
|
* @param v Verb |
|
*/ |
|
Packet(const Address& dest, const Address& source, const Verb v) : Buffer<ZT_PROTO_MAX_PACKET_LENGTH>(ZT_PROTO_MIN_PACKET_LENGTH) |
|
{ |
|
Utils::getSecureRandom(field(ZT_PACKET_IDX_IV, 8), 8); |
|
setDestination(dest); |
|
setSource(source); |
|
(*this)[ZT_PACKET_IDX_FLAGS] = 0; // zero flags and hops |
|
setVerb(v); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* Reset this packet structure for reuse in place |
|
* |
|
* @param dest Destination ZT address |
|
* @param source Source ZT address |
|
* @param v Verb |
|
*/ |
|
inline void reset(const Address& dest, const Address& source, const Verb v) |
|
{ |
|
setSize(ZT_PROTO_MIN_PACKET_LENGTH); |
|
Utils::getSecureRandom(field(ZT_PACKET_IDX_IV, 8), 8); |
|
setDestination(dest); |
|
setSource(source); |
|
(*this)[ZT_PACKET_IDX_FLAGS] = 0; // zero flags, cipher ID, and hops |
|
setVerb(v); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* Generate a new IV / packet ID in place |
|
* |
|
* This can be used to re-use a packet buffer multiple times to send |
|
* technically different but otherwise identical copies of the same |
|
* packet. |
|
*/ |
|
inline void newInitializationVector() |
|
{ |
|
Utils::getSecureRandom(field(ZT_PACKET_IDX_IV, 8), 8); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* Set this packet's destination |
|
* |
|
* @param dest ZeroTier address of destination |
|
*/ |
|
inline void setDestination(const Address& dest) |
|
{ |
|
dest.copyTo(field(ZT_PACKET_IDX_DEST, ZT_ADDRESS_LENGTH), ZT_ADDRESS_LENGTH); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* Set this packet's source |
|
* |
|
* @param source ZeroTier address of source |
|
*/ |
|
inline void setSource(const Address& source) |
|
{ |
|
source.copyTo(field(ZT_PACKET_IDX_SOURCE, ZT_ADDRESS_LENGTH), ZT_ADDRESS_LENGTH); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* Get this packet's destination |
|
* |
|
* @return Destination ZT address |
|
*/ |
|
inline Address destination() const |
|
{ |
|
return Address(field(ZT_PACKET_IDX_DEST, ZT_ADDRESS_LENGTH), ZT_ADDRESS_LENGTH); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* Get this packet's source |
|
* |
|
* @return Source ZT address |
|
*/ |
|
inline Address source() const |
|
{ |
|
return Address(field(ZT_PACKET_IDX_SOURCE, ZT_ADDRESS_LENGTH), ZT_ADDRESS_LENGTH); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* @return True if packet is of valid length |
|
*/ |
|
inline bool lengthValid() const |
|
{ |
|
return (size() >= ZT_PROTO_MIN_PACKET_LENGTH); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* @return True if packet is fragmented (expect fragments) |
|
*/ |
|
inline bool fragmented() const |
|
{ |
|
return (((unsigned char)(*this)[ZT_PACKET_IDX_FLAGS] & ZT_PROTO_FLAG_FRAGMENTED) != 0); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* Set this packet's fragmented flag |
|
* |
|
* @param f Fragmented flag value |
|
*/ |
|
inline void setFragmented(bool f) |
|
{ |
|
if (f) { |
|
(*this)[ZT_PACKET_IDX_FLAGS] |= (char)ZT_PROTO_FLAG_FRAGMENTED; |
|
} |
|
else { |
|
(*this)[ZT_PACKET_IDX_FLAGS] &= (char)(~ZT_PROTO_FLAG_FRAGMENTED); |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* @return True if packet is encrypted with an extra ephemeral key |
|
*/ |
|
inline bool extendedArmor() const |
|
{ |
|
return (((unsigned char)(*this)[ZT_PACKET_IDX_FLAGS] & ZT_PROTO_FLAG_EXTENDED_ARMOR) != 0); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* Set this packet's extended armor flag |
|
* |
|
* @param f Extended armor flag value |
|
*/ |
|
inline void setExtendedArmor(bool f) |
|
{ |
|
if (f) { |
|
(*this)[ZT_PACKET_IDX_FLAGS] |= (char)ZT_PROTO_FLAG_EXTENDED_ARMOR; |
|
} |
|
else { |
|
(*this)[ZT_PACKET_IDX_FLAGS] &= (char)(~ZT_PROTO_FLAG_EXTENDED_ARMOR); |
|
} |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* @return True if compressed (result only valid if unencrypted) |
|
*/ |
|
inline bool compressed() const |
|
{ |
|
return (((unsigned char)(*this)[ZT_PACKET_IDX_VERB] & ZT_PROTO_VERB_FLAG_COMPRESSED) != 0); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* @return ZeroTier forwarding hops (0 to 7) |
|
*/ |
|
inline unsigned int hops() const |
|
{ |
|
return ((unsigned int)(*this)[ZT_PACKET_IDX_FLAGS] & 0x07); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* Increment this packet's hop count |
|
*/ |
|
inline void incrementHops() |
|
{ |
|
unsigned char& b = (*this)[ZT_PACKET_IDX_FLAGS]; |
|
b = (b & 0xf8) | ((b + 1) & 0x07); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* @return Cipher suite selector: 0 - 7 (see #defines) |
|
*/ |
|
inline unsigned int cipher() const |
|
{ |
|
return (((unsigned int)(*this)[ZT_PACKET_IDX_FLAGS] & 0x38) >> 3); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* @return Whether this packet is currently encrypted |
|
*/ |
|
inline bool isEncrypted() const |
|
{ |
|
return (cipher() == ZT_PROTO_CIPHER_SUITE__C25519_POLY1305_SALSA2012) || (cipher() == ZT_PROTO_CIPHER_SUITE__AES_GMAC_SIV); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* Set this packet's cipher suite |
|
*/ |
|
inline void setCipher(unsigned int c) |
|
{ |
|
unsigned char& b = (*this)[ZT_PACKET_IDX_FLAGS]; |
|
b = (b & 0xc7) | (unsigned char)((c << 3) & 0x38); // bits: FFCCCHHH |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* Get the trusted path ID for this packet (only meaningful if cipher is trusted path) |
|
* |
|
* @return Trusted path ID (from MAC field) |
|
*/ |
|
inline uint64_t trustedPathId() const |
|
{ |
|
return at<uint64_t>(ZT_PACKET_IDX_MAC); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* Set this packet's trusted path ID and set the cipher spec to trusted path |
|
* |
|
* @param tpid Trusted path ID |
|
*/ |
|
inline void setTrusted(const uint64_t tpid) |
|
{ |
|
setCipher(ZT_PROTO_CIPHER_SUITE__NO_CRYPTO_TRUSTED_PATH); |
|
setAt(ZT_PACKET_IDX_MAC, tpid); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* Get this packet's unique ID (the IV field interpreted as uint64_t) |
|
* |
|
* Note that the least significant 3 bits of this ID will change when armor() |
|
* is called to armor the packet for transport. This is because armor() will |
|
* mask the last 3 bits against the send counter for QoS monitoring use prior |
|
* to actually using the IV to encrypt and MAC the packet. Be aware of this |
|
* when grabbing the packetId of a new packet prior to armor/send. |
|
* |
|
* @return Packet ID |
|
*/ |
|
inline uint64_t packetId() const |
|
{ |
|
return at<uint64_t>(ZT_PACKET_IDX_IV); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* Set packet verb |
|
* |
|
* This also has the side-effect of clearing any verb flags, such as |
|
* compressed, and so must only be done during packet composition. |
|
* |
|
* @param v New packet verb |
|
*/ |
|
inline void setVerb(Verb v) |
|
{ |
|
(*this)[ZT_PACKET_IDX_VERB] = (char)v; |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* @return Packet verb (not including flag bits) |
|
*/ |
|
inline Verb verb() const |
|
{ |
|
return (Verb)((*this)[ZT_PACKET_IDX_VERB] & 0x1f); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* @return Length of packet payload |
|
*/ |
|
inline unsigned int payloadLength() const |
|
{ |
|
return ((size() < ZT_PROTO_MIN_PACKET_LENGTH) ? 0 : (size() - ZT_PROTO_MIN_PACKET_LENGTH)); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* @return Raw packet payload |
|
*/ |
|
inline const unsigned char* payload() const |
|
{ |
|
return field(ZT_PACKET_IDX_PAYLOAD, size() - ZT_PACKET_IDX_PAYLOAD); |
|
} |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* Armor packet for transport |
|
* |
|
* @param key 32-byte key |
|
* @param encryptPayload If true, encrypt packet payload, else just MAC |
|
* @param extendedArmor Use an ephemeral key to encrypt payload (for encrypted HELLO) |
|
* @param identity Identity of packet recipient/destination |
|
* @param aesKeys If non-NULL these are the two keys for AES-GMAC-SIV |
|
*/ |
|
void armor(const void* key, bool encryptPayload, bool extendedArmor, const AES aesKeys[2], const Identity& identity); |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* Verify and (if encrypted) decrypt packet |
|
* |
|
* This does not handle trusted path mode packets and will return false |
|
* for these. These are handled in IncomingPacket if the sending physical |
|
* address and MAC field match a trusted path. |
|
* |
|
* @param key 32-byte key |
|
* @param aesKeys If non-NULL these are the two keys for AES-GMAC-SIV |
|
* @param identity Receiver's identity (must include secret) |
|
* @return False if packet is invalid or failed MAC authenticity check |
|
*/ |
|
bool dearmor(const void* key, const AES aesKeys[2], const Identity& identity); |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* Encrypt/decrypt a separately armored portion of a packet |
|
* |
|
* This is currently only used to mask portions of HELLO as an extra |
|
* security precaution since most of that message is sent in the clear. |
|
* |
|
* This must NEVER be used more than once in the same packet, as doing |
|
* so will result in re-use of the same key stream. |
|
* |
|
* @param key 32-byte key |
|
* @param start Start of encrypted portion |
|
* @param len Length of encrypted portion |
|
*/ |
|
void cryptField(const void* key, unsigned int start, unsigned int len); |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* Attempt to compress payload if not already (must be unencrypted) |
|
* |
|
* This requires that the payload at least contain the verb byte already |
|
* set. The compressed flag in the verb is set if compression successfully |
|
* results in a size reduction. If no size reduction occurs, compression |
|
* is not done and the flag is left cleared. |
|
* |
|
* @return True if compression occurred |
|
*/ |
|
bool compress(); |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* Attempt to decompress payload if it is compressed (must be unencrypted) |
|
* |
|
* If payload is compressed, it is decompressed and the compressed verb |
|
* flag is cleared. Otherwise nothing is done and true is returned. |
|
* |
|
* @return True if data is now decompressed and valid, false on error |
|
*/ |
|
bool uncompress(); |
|
|
|
private: |
|
static const unsigned char ZERO_KEY[32]; |
|
|
|
/** |
|
* Deterministically mangle a 256-bit crypto key based on packet |
|
* |
|
* This uses extra data from the packet to mangle the secret, giving us an |
|
* effective IV that is somewhat more than 64 bits. This is "free" for |
|
* Salsa20 since it has negligible key setup time so using a different |
|
* key each time is fine. |
|
* |
|
* @param in Input key (32 bytes) |
|
* @param out Output buffer (32 bytes) |
|
*/ |
|
inline void _salsa20MangleKey(const unsigned char* in, unsigned char* out) const |
|
{ |
|
const unsigned char* d = (const unsigned char*)data(); |
|
|
|
// IV and source/destination addresses. Using the addresses divides the |
|
// key space into two halves-- A->B and B->A (since order will change). |
|
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < 18; ++i) { // 8 + (ZT_ADDRESS_LENGTH * 2) == 18 |
|
out[i] = in[i] ^ d[i]; |
|
} |
|
|
|
// Flags, but with hop count masked off. Hop count is altered by forwarding |
|
// nodes. It's one of the only parts of a packet modifiable by people |
|
// without the key. |
|
out[18] = in[18] ^ (d[ZT_PACKET_IDX_FLAGS] & 0xf8); |
|
|
|
// Raw packet size in bytes -- thus each packet size defines a new |
|
// key space. |
|
out[19] = in[19] ^ (unsigned char)(size() & 0xff); |
|
out[20] = in[20] ^ (unsigned char)((size() >> 8) & 0xff); // little endian |
|
|
|
// Rest of raw key is used unchanged |
|
for (unsigned int i = 21; i < 32; ++i) { |
|
out[i] = in[i]; |
|
} |
|
} |
|
}; |
|
|
|
} // namespace ZeroTier |
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|