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@ -514,7 +514,22 @@ static _doZtFilterResult _doZtFilter(
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if ((etherType == ZT_ETHERTYPE_IPV4)&&(frameLen >= 20)) { |
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src.set((const void *)(frameData + 12),4,0); |
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} else if ((etherType == ZT_ETHERTYPE_IPV6)&&(frameLen >= 40)) { |
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src.set((const void *)(frameData + 8),16,0); |
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// IPv6 NDP requires special handling, since the src and dest IPs in the packet are empty or link-local.
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unsigned int pos = 0,proto = 0; |
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if ( (frameLen >= (40 + 8 + 16)) && (frameData[6] == 0x3a) && ((frameData[40] == 0x87)||(frameData[40] == 0x88)) ) { |
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if (frameData[40] == 0x87) { |
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// Neighbor solicitations contain no reliable source address, so we implement a small
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// hack by considering them authenticated. Otherwise you would pretty much have to do
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// this manually in the rule set for IPv6 to work at all.
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ownershipVerificationMask |= ZT_RULE_PACKET_CHARACTERISTICS_SENDER_IP_AUTHENTICATED; |
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} else { |
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// Neighbor advertisements on the other hand can absolutely be authenticated.
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src.set((const void *)(frameData + 40 + 8),16,0); |
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} |
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} else { |
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// Other IPv6 packets can be handled normally
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src.set((const void *)(frameData + 8),16,0); |
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} |
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} else if ((etherType == ZT_ETHERTYPE_ARP)&&(frameLen >= 28)) { |
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src.set((const void *)(frameData + 14),4,0); |
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} |
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